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We are running out of superlatives to describe political and constitutional events
over the last decade or so. ‘Crisis’ has been used to describe so many events since
2008, whether financial, economic, migration-related, environmental, political and
now public health that it seems to have almost lost its meaning due to overuse.
However, the current coronavirus pandemic seems to have made the previous crises
– particularly in Europe – pale by comparison. In some ways it is a perfect storm of
the previous crises that have hit Europe in the past decade with a large-scale threat
to human life thrown in for good measure.
Analysing such an overwhelming event, or perhaps more accurately series of related
events, can seem like a Sisyphean task. The coronavirus pandemic is a fast-moving
phenomenon with so many moving parts that analysis can seem trite, irrelevant,
or well wide of the mark, not least due to a rash of ultracrepidarian lane-switching
from analysts in the early stages of the pandemic: ‘We are all epidemiologists
now.’ However, as with previous crises, constitutional analysis is still important
both at national and EU levels to ensure that whatever the ‘new normal’ is when
we emerge blinking into our neighbourhoods again, we do so having preserved the
core governing arrangements at national and supranational level, as well as the
constitutional democratic norms which support them, while the silent storm raged
outside.
The constitutional questions which emerge from the pandemic involve some familiar
motifs from previous crises. The law of the exception and executive empowerment
on a massive scale, on which many of us cut our teeth in the post-9/11 era, is
making a (somewhat predictable) comeback; as are the familiar tunes, however
depressingly, of the eurozone crisis of the early 2010s including issues of debt
mutualisation in the form of ‘coronabonds’ and the seemingly increasingly quixotic
quest for an ever-elusive pan-EU solidarity. Of course the current pandemic does
introduce some new variations on old themes:  for example, alongside familiar
arguments regarding the invocation of Art. 15 ECHR, we can expect Art. 5 (1)
(e) ECHR regulating detention to prevent the spread of infectious diseases –
complacently dismissed by some of us as a redundant provision belonging to
a bygone almost quasi-medieval era where plagues still happened – to get a
considerable workout over the coming months and years.
In this post, I want to focus on two issues of the many emergent themes in the
constitutional politics of pandemic management: expertise and political accountability
and the classic tension between legality and legitimacy in EU governance; and
particularly what Max Weber, arguably the greatest theorists of political legitimacy,
can teach us about these issues in the context of responses to the coronavirus
pandemic.
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Expertise and Political Accountability
A particularly interesting theme of interest to constitutional analysts which emerged
in the UK is the relationship between independent expert, particularly scientific,
advice and pandemic management responses from national executives.
As is well known, the UK (along with the Netherlands and Sweden) held off on
adopting measures more stringent than providing handwashing and face-touching
etiquette as well as voluntary self-isolation for those with symptoms, while the rest of
Europe was in various stages of lock-down. Reports of a UK ‘herd immunity’ strategy
started to circulate with allegations that the government was sacrificing vulnerable
people, and many organisations – businesses, universities and other institutions
– decided to take unilateral action and shut down even before a formal decision
was taken by the government. In the face of an increasingly restive public, the
government began to hold regular public briefings where experts were given pride
of place. The government ostentatiously flaunted the role of expertise in its crisis
response with ministers hosting press briefings flanked by experts who frequently
fielded more questions than government ministers themselves. This was coupled
with repeated assertions by the government that they were “scrupulously” following
“the best scientific advice”.  Some even lauded the superior wisdom of the UK’s
“entirely science-led” approach to managing the pandemic over the approaches
of other countries (a not entirely concealed reference to Spain and Italy who had
recently adopted stringent lockdown measures) who were said to be pursuing a
more “populist approach”.  More stringent measures were eventually introduced in
the UK on March 23rd, mirroring, to a large extent, those introduced elsewhere a
week or two previously. Criticism of the government’s policy was met with the not
entirely unreasonable response that with respect to the role of experts in government
decision-making, this particular government is ‘damned if it doesn’t and damned if it
does’. This is because this particular government is stuffed with Brexit leaders who
famously declared in the run up to the 2016 referendum that ‘people had had enough
of experts’ when challenged with research on the economic consequences of Brexit.
Thus, in trumpeting the role of experts in formulating its coronavirus policy response,
this government is distancing itself, it seems, from its previous disdain for experts in
the Brexit process.
The controversy surrounding the UK government’s response, and particularly the
role of scientific expertise in formulating that response, raise interesting constitutional
questions of political accountability. On the one hand, we want policy responses to
be effective such that the government discharges one of its most fundamental duties
in constitutional democracies –  protecting the safety and security of the governed
– and including scientific expertise in that response is part and parcel of that duty.
Unfortunately, the US Federal government’s response to the pandemic provides
a live case study of the consequences of rejecting or belatedly heeding expert
advice on widespread public health threats. However, there are also dangers when
scientific expertise dominates executive decision-making. From an effectiveness
perspective, risks of cognitive bias can lead to the exclusion of expert opinion or
scientific research which doesn’t fit our priors. From a constitutional perspective, an
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overt and unquestioning reliance on expert opinion in policy-making can cloud issues
of accountability in decision-making.
In gauging ‘how much is too much’ in the extent to which executive decision-making
relies on scientific evidence in the current pandemic, it is useful to recall Max
Weber’s distinction between the virtues of the scholar (or expert) and the virtues of
the politician in his two famous lectures ‘Science as Vocation’ in 1917 and ‘Politics
as Vocation’ in 1919. Simplifying considerably, for Weber, the virtues of the scholar
or scientist lie in ‘clear-sightedness and intellectual integrity’  providing productive
questions rather than definitive answers whereas the virtues of the politician lie, in
part, in the ethic of responsibility involving the idea that politicians must answer for
the consequences of their actions.
Thus, the distinction between the virtues of scholarship (or experts) and the virtues
of the politician lie in the fact that latter is focused on action, and particularly
action which achieves particular effects such as the protection of the public
from threats to public health, while the former relates to a study of discrete and
narrow questions where solutions may remain open or speculative and intellectual
integrity is the primary virtue.  The ethic of responsibility can be said to create
two requirements on political decision-making involving scientific expertise which
are distinct from the virtues of the scientist. Firstly, given that it is focussed on
action and consequence, political actors should look at scientific expertise on a
particular matter in the round, and not just the speculative answers provided by
one stream of research, to come to the best possible conclusion about the most
effective action. Secondly, it also requires that decision-making is not based on
the speculative answers to the discrete questions provided by experts in one field
of expertise – biological, mathematical, epidemiological, social, psychological,
economic and so on – but on a more general political sense of effective action in
the public interest.  Political representatives govern not just in the interests of small
businesses, employees, care-home workers, people with compromised immune
systems, medical professionals, the elderly, the poor, students, parents or children
but in a more general public sense. The most effective action is therefore guided by
this sense of the public interest rather than the discrete interests of particular, for
example economic, constituencies.
This cashes out in different standards of judgment for critiquing the work of scientists
and political actors in the context of pandemic crisis management. The ethic of
responsibility requires that politicians in particular be judged by the consequences
of their decisions. Thus, when deferring completely and unquestioningly to experts,
political representatives do not discharge the duties imposed by the ethic of
responsibility. As political representatives, charged with the special duty to act in
the public interest as a whole, they cannot outsource this responsibility to the word
of experts. The ethic of responsibility precludes a political ‘Nuremberg defense’:
where decisions have harmful consequences, where they fail to protect the life and
health of the governed because, for example, acting sooner or making a different
decision may have saved more lives, “the experts made me do it” is no defense. This
ethic of responsibility should guide how we evaluate and critique where necessary
governmental action taken by governments once the crisis has subsided.
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Legality and Legitimacy
The pandemic raises distinct issues for the European Union and the pursuit of the
holy grail of its legitimacy. In particular it shines a light on the relationship between
legality and legitimacy in shoring up its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. Legality,
the story usually goes, has served the EU well as far as its legitimacy is concerned.
 From a political realist perspective, the role of law in ensuring the equal treatment
of member states (at least once the rules have been agreed), serves to enhance
buy-in by state elites, and particularly executives, to the integration project. More
recently, cleaving to rules and process have been hailed as a successful strategy
in managing the fallout of the UK’s decision to leave the bloc.  Constitutionally
speaking, constitutional courts have predicated the legitimacy of EU actors (including
the EU courts) on their respect for legality as embodied by the principle of conferral,
such that EU institutions act strictly within their legal limits.
The coronavirus pandemic tests the robustness of this particular legitimating
strategy for the EU and questions the wisdom of relying on legality exclusively in
shoring up its legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. In some quarters, particularly in
Italy, an already growing Euroscepticism has been exacerbated by the perceived
‘abandonment’ by the EU of the country in its time of need. In fighting this particular
legitimacy challenge, legality is wholly inadequate. What frightened, frustrated and
concerned citizens witness in their lived experience in this pandemic is that hospitals
are full, people around them are dying and that one of their governments – the EU
one – is failing utterly to protect them. Responding to this experience with legal
explanations about balances of competences and historical explanations for the
lack of EU competence in health matters based on Member State fears sparked by
ECJ rulings about access to cross border health care fall on deaf ears and do little
to provide comfort to citizens. Similarly, the EU’s stuttered response to the economic
fall out of the crisis enraging some of the same member states can similarly be
explained, in part, by an overemphasis on legality and competences to the detriment
of action and consequence. It has long been known that legality and legitimacy
can serve different purposes yet the EU can be accused of failing to realise this
sufficiently. Here again, Weber can help us understand what is needed. Alongside
the ethic of responsibility, Weber spoke of a political ethic of conviction, whereby a
free agent must be free to choose both their means and ends. In thinking about the
means necessary to respond to the coronavirus pandemic pursuant to an EU ethic
of conviction, it could take heed of the comments of the W.H.O’s director of health
emergencies on how to address pandemics:
“Be fast, have no regrets. You must be the first mover. The virus will always
get you if you don’t move quickly.”
The EU has generally been slow to tap into alternative resources of legitimacy
beyond strict legality and develop its own sense of its ethic of conviction. The
European Central Bank has arguably been one of the most courageous in this
regard albeit after an initial stumble, but the organisation as a whole needs to
explore these possibilities, and soon, if its legitimacy is to come out of this crisis
intact. Such action is not easy, nor uncomplicated in a complex supranational
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configuration like the EU and there are faint glimmers of an emergent EU ethic of
conviction in von der Leyen’s recent apology to Italy, and Macron’s stirring call for
financial solidarity. However, one thing is clear; unless EU institutions and political
actors develop a more autonomous and robust ethic of conviction by moving beyond
legality as the key legitimating strategy of the EU, it may not survive the coronavirus
pandemic with its legitimacy intact.
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